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1309 
Defamation and John Does: Increased Protections 
and Relaxed Standing Requirements for Anonymous 
Internet Speech 
I. INTRODUCTION 
With the onslaught of blogging and discussion forums on the 
Internet, the marketplace of ideas has undergone a dramatic 
expansion.1 One commentator has suggested that “the Internet may 
. . . be the greatest innovation in speech since the invention of the 
printing press.”2 Another has praised the democratizing effects of the 
Internet, observing that “[t]he Internet is a democratic institution in 
the fullest sense. It serves as the modern equivalent of Speakers’ 
Corner in England’s Hyde Park, where ordinary people may voice 
their opinions . . . .”3 One reason that the Internet facilitates speech 
so effectively may be that it makes it incredibly easy for a speaker to 
veil his or her identity while simultaneously reaching a vast audience, 
which was previously difficult, or even impossible with a traditional 
flier or handbill. At least one court has noted the value of anonymity 
on the Internet. 
The free exchange of ideas on the Internet is driven in large part by 
the ability of Internet users to communicate anonymously. . . . 
Internet anonymity facilitates the rich, diverse, and far ranging 
exchange of ideas. . . . For this reason, the constitutional rights of 
Internet users, including the First Amendment right to speak 
anonymously, must be carefully safeguarded.4  
 
  I thank Associate Professor RonNell Andersen Jones for her guidance and helpful 
input on earlier drafts.  
 1. See DANIEL J. SOLOVE, THE FUTURE OF REPUTATION: GOSSIP, RUMOR, AND 
PRIVACY ON THE INTERNET 21 (2007) (estimating that there were over fifty million blogs on 
the Internet by the end of July 2006).  
 2. Raymond Shih Ray Ku, Open Internet Access and Freedom of Speech: A First 
Amendment Catch-22, 75 TUL. L. REV. 87, 88 (2000). 
 3. Brief for Public Citizen, Electronic Frontier Foundation, and Electronic Privacy 
Information Center as Amici Curiae at 5, Melvin v. Doe, 836 A.2d 42 (Pa. 2003) (Nos. 50 
WAP 2002 and 51 WAP 2002); see also Doe v. 2TheMart.com Inc., 140 F. Supp. 2d 1088, 
1097 (W.D. Wash. 2001) (“The Internet is a truly democratic forum for communication. It 
allows for the free exchange of ideas at an unprecedented speed and scale.”). 
 4. 2TheMart.com, 140 F. Supp. 2d at 1091–93, 1097. 
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However, other commentators have argued that anonymity 
decreases speaker accountability and therefore increases the potential 
for “irresponsible, malicious, and harmful communication.” 5 
The flash flood of anonymous speech that has surged into the 
cyber marketplace of ideas has brought with it complex legal issues 
that have challenged existing First Amendment doctrines in many 
areas, particularly in regards to the issue of potentially defamatory 
anonymous speech. One commentator noted, “[A]s the Internet 
turns more ordinary John Does into publishers, it is also turning 
them into defamation defendants.”6 These defamation cases have 
ranged from derogatory sexual comments directed at unsuspecting 
college students,7 to political criticism of company policies.8 In such 
cases, aggrieved plaintiffs have sought to unveil the identity of the 
allegedly defamatory speakers through a court order. However, the 
difficulty in making such a determination about a speaker’s identity is 
that “the decision is usually made at the outset of litigation, before a 
full record may be developed,” and this is a “critical, and often 
outcome-determinative, decision.”9 
In light of these issues, this Comment seeks to address two 
important questions that the Supreme Court has yet to answer. First, 
what must a private plaintiff do in order to discover the identity of a 
speaker through the use of a civil subpoena in a defamation action;10 
and second, which parties have standing to assert the rights of 
 
 5. Quixtar Inc. v. Signature Mgmt. Team, LLC, 566 F. Supp. 2d 1205, 1214 (D. Nev. 
2008). 
 6. Lyrissa Barnett Lidsky, Silencing John Doe: Defamation and Discourse in Cyberspace, 
49 DUKE L.J. 855, 945 (2000). 
 7. Doe I v. Individuals, 561 F. Supp. 2d 249, 251 (D. Conn. 2008). 
 8. Dendrite Int’l, Inc. v. Doe No. 3, 775 A.2d 756 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 2001); 
In re Subpoena Duces Tecum to Am. Online, Inc., 52 Va. Cir. 26 (Cir. Ct. 2000), rev’d, on 
other grounds sub nom. Am. Online, Inc. v. Anonymous Publicly Traded Co., 542 S.E.2d 377 
(Va. 2001); see also Konrad Lee, Anti-Employer Blogging: Employee Breach of the Duty of Loyalty 
and the Procedure for Allowing Discovery of a Blogger’s Identity before Service of Process is 
Effected, 2006 DUKE L. & TECH. REV. 2; Konrad S. Lee, Hiding From the Boss Online: The 
Anti-Employer Blogger’s Legal Quest for Anonymity, 23 SANTA CLARA COMPUTER & HIGH 
TECH. L.J. 135 (2006). 
 9. Michael S. Vogel, Unmasking “John Doe” Defendants: The Case Against Excessive 
Hand-Wringing over Legal Standards, 83 OR. L. REV. 795, 799 (2004). Furthermore, Vogel 
points out: “What is worse, the decision will often be subject to only limited appellate review . 
. . .” Id. For this reason, some courts have argued that there ought to be heightened appellate 
review for the determination of whether to disclose a speaker’s identity. See, e.g., Melvin v. 
Doe, 836 A.2d 42 (Pa. 2003). 
 10. Doe v. 2TheMart.com Inc., 140 F. Supp. 2d 1088, 1091 (W.D. Wash. 2001). 
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anonymous speakers on the Internet? This Comment answers these 
questions by proposing a new test to balance the competing interests 
presented in this area of the law and by arguing that third-party 
standing requirements should be relaxed to prevent speech from 
being chilled.  
In Part II, this Comment analyzes the legal development of 
defamation law and the most recent case law dealing with 
anonymous Internet speech. In Part III, this Comment argues that 
current standards are insufficient to protect the rights of anonymous 
speakers and, further, that third-party standing requirements should 
be relaxed so that more powerful organizations, like Internet service 
providers (“ISPs”), trade organizations, communication forums, or 
even press organizations are able to assert the protections that are 
afforded to anonymous Internet speakers. Part III also proposes 
solutions to meet the competing interests presented in this area of 
the law. Part IV provides a brief conclusion.  
II. LEGAL DEVELOPMENT  
This Part proceeds in four Parts. Part A discusses First 
Amendment protections of anonymous speech. Part B looks at the 
evolution of defamation law. Part C considers the unique challenge 
of protecting potentially defamatory anonymous speech on the 
Internet. Part D concludes this Part by setting forth the current 
standards of protection for anonymous Internet speakers. 
A. First Amendment Protections of Anonymous Speech 
The Supreme Court has clearly recognized a First Amendment 
right to speak anonymously.11 The Court has found that the freedom 
of conscience is housed in the First Amendment and that this 
freedom includes the freedom to speak, as well as the freedom to 
choose not to speak.12 The right to not speak includes the right of a 
speaker not to disclose his or her identity. For instance, in Talley v. 
California, the Court found an ordinance prohibiting distribution of 
anonymous handbills invalid on its face.13 The Court explained that 
 
 11. E.g., Watchtower Bible & Tract Soc’y of N.Y., Inc., v. Vill. of Stratton, 536 U.S. 
150 (2002); Buckley v. Am. Constitutional Law Found., Inc., 525 U.S. 182 (1999); McIntyre 
v. Ohio Elections Comm’n, 514 U.S. 334 (1995); Talley v. California, 362 U.S. 60 (1960).  
 12. Wooley v. Maynard, 430 U.S. 705 (1977). 
 13. 362 U.S. 60 (1960).  
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“[p]ersecuted groups and sects from time to time throughout history 
have been able to criticize oppressive practices and laws either 
anonymously or not at all.”14  
Similarly, in McIntyre v. Ohio Elections Commission, the Court 
invalidated an election law that prohibited the anonymous 
circulation of leaflets.15 The Court explained that “[a]nonymity is a 
shield from the tyranny of the majority. It thus exemplifies the 
purpose behind . . . the First Amendment,” which is to protect 
unpopular individuals from retaliation—and their ideas from 
suppression—at the hand of an intolerant society.”16 In Justice 
Thomas’s concurring opinion, he provided historic evidence that the 
Framers felt the right to speak anonymously was a critical component 
of the freedom of speech. Thomas cited examples of the Federalist 
Papers that were published under the pseudonym of “Publius,”17 as 
well as the famous Zenger trial of 1735, which involved a printer 
who refused to reveal the “anonymous authors of published attacks 
on the Crown governor of New York.”18 When the governor could 
not retrieve the identity of the speakers, he prosecuted the printer for 
libel.19 However, the jury refused to convict the defendant. Thomas 
also cited the example of the Anti-Federalist attack on the Federalist 
editors’ policy against allowing writers to publish anonymous works. 
Thomas argued that this “historical evidence indicates that 
Founding-era Americans opposed attempts to require that 
anonymous authors reveal their identities.”20 Thus, the Supreme 
Court very clearly protected First Amendment rights of speakers who 
wished to remain anonymous.21 
Furthermore, the Supreme Court has not held that there is 
anything unique about speech on the Internet that should qualify 
this right to speak anonymously. The Supreme Court found that its 
precedent “provide[d] no basis for qualifying the level of First 
Amendment scrutiny that should be applied to [the Internet].”22 
 
 14. Id. at 64. 
 15. McIntyre, 514 U.S. at 334.  
 16. Id. at 357. 
 17. Id. at 360–61 (Thomas, J., concurring).  
 18. Id. at 361. 
 19. Id. 
 20. Id.  
 21. Id. at 363–64.  
 22. Reno v. ACLU, 521 U.S. 844, 870 (1997). 
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B. The Evolution of Defamation Law 
The freedom of speech, however, is not absolute. Certain types 
of speech, such as defamation, have long been considered to be, to 
some extent, outside the realm of First Amendment protection. 
According to the Restatement of Torts, the elements of an 
actionable defamation claim include first, a false and defamatory 
statement concerning another; second, an unprivileged 
communication to a third-party; third, fault amounting to at least 
negligence on the part of the publisher (though the amount of fault 
changes depending on the status of the individual who was targeted 
by the defamatory speech); and fourth, some sort of damages or 
harm caused.23  
After overcoming the obstacle of presenting a prima facie 
defamation case, the plaintiff must then overcome First Amendment 
protections. Originally, in Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, the Court 
provided no protection for libelous speech, explaining that “[t]here 
are certain well-defined and narrowly limited classes of speech, the 
prevention and punishment of which ha[ve] never been thought to 
raise any Constitutional problem. These include . . . the 
libelous . . . .”24 The Court explained that because libelous or 
defamatory speech was viewed as having such “slight social value,” it 
was not entitled to First Amendment protection.25  
The Court provided much more generous protections for 
potentially libelous speech in New York Times v. Sullivan when it 
articulated a standard that swept libelous speech into the realm of 
First Amendment protection, with specific limitations.26 The 
countervailing interests that the Court identified were the need to 
protect the reputations of individuals, versus the strong First 
Amendment interest in free expression, which could be chilled or 
limited if tort liability were too strong.27  
In an attempt to strike a balance between these competing 
interests, the Court articulated a standard that varied depending on 
the status of the individual targeted by the speech. If the individual is 
a public official, he or she cannot recover damages for a defamatory 
 
 23. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 558 (1977).  
 24. Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568, 571–72 (1942) (emphasis added).  
 25. Id. at 572. 
 26. 376 U.S. 254 (1964).  
 27. Id. at 281; id. at 301 (Black, J., concurring).  
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falsehood relating to official conduct unless he or she proves that the 
statement was made with actual malice, which is defined as willful 
falsity or reckless disregard of whether the statement was false.28 
Later cases found that if the target of speech is a private figure who 
has not voluntarily thrust himself or herself into the public sphere or 
achieved a great deal of fame and notoriety, then the plaintiff need 
only prove that the speech was negligent by a preponderance of the 
evidence.29  
The Sullivan Court explained that the justification for giving 
such strong First Amendment protections to libelous speech was 
based on “a profound national commitment to the principle that 
debate on public issues should be uninhibited, robust, and wide-
open, and that it may well include vehement, caustic, and sometimes 
unpleasantly sharp attacks . . . .”30 Furthermore, the Court reasoned 
that even false statements were deserving of protection at times, 
because “erroneous statement is inevitable in free debate and [must] 
be protected if the freedoms of expression are to have the ‘breathing 
space’ that they ‘need . . . to survive.’”31  
C. The Unique Challenge of Protecting Potentially Defamatory 
Anonymous Speech on the Internet 
The Supreme Court has not articulated a clear rule or balancing 
test to determine when the government may pierce the veil of 
anonymity of speakers on the Internet who have posted allegedly 
defamatory statements. This type of speech presents its own set of 
unique challenges. First, it is important to note that when a court 
forces a speaker to disclose his or her identity, the court is going 
beyond the ordinary civil punishment for defamatory speech; the 
 
 28. Id. at 280 (majority opinion). In Curtis Publishing Co. v. Butts, 388 U.S. 130 
(1967), and Associated Press v. Walker, 389 U.S. 28 (1967), the Court extended this malice 
standard to persons who were not public officials, but who were public figures in issues in 
which the public has an important and justified interest.  
 29. E.g., Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323 (1974). 
 30. Sullivan, 376 U.S. at 270. 
 31. Id. at 271–72 (quoting NAACP v. Button, 371 U.S. 415, 433 (1963)). This 
combination of tort and constitutional hurdles that a plaintiff must overcome to establish a 
defamation claim makes it incredibly difficult for defamation claims to succeed. Indeed, as 
Professor Lidsky notes, “Empirical studies confirm that the practical effect of these labyrinthine 
doctrines is to make it almost impossible for any plaintiff to succeed in a defamation action. 
Statistics show that only 13% of plaintiffs ultimately prevail in libel litigation . . . .” Lidsky, 
supra note 6, at 875. 
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court is actually compelling the anonymous individual to speak his or 
her identity, thereby directly interfering with the individual’s 
freedom of speech. Thus, even though defamatory speech loses some 
of its First Amendment protection, the speaker’s identity is separate 
from defamatory speech and ought to carry separate First 
Amendment protections.  
Second, at least one court has observed that “there is reason to 
believe that many defamation plaintiffs bring suit merely to unmask 
the identities of anonymous critics.”32 Indeed, one commentator 
suggests that Internet defamation actions are often “not really about 
money,” but are rather motivated by a belief in the social, 
psychological, or symbolic benefits.33 In other words, many plaintiffs 
bring these suits purely for vindictive reasons and literally have 
nothing to lose should their suit not be successful. This observation 
raises particular concerns in the area of anonymous speech because if 
plaintiffs are able to bring superfluous lawsuits, regardless of the 
validity of the claim, then they could do so merely to strip the 
speaker of anonymity. Plaintiffs could then bring an Internet SLAPP 
suit (Strategic Lawsuits Against Public Participation) solely to harass 
and silence critics.34 Thus, if the standards for protecting the identity 
of an anonymous speaker were no greater than the requirements for 
a prima facie libel case, many speakers could be stripped of their 
anonymity, literally, as a punishment for unappreciated speech that is 
not necessarily defamatory.  
The Internet in particular provides a dramatic setting to contrast 
these competing interests. Courts have recognized the democratizing 
power of the Internet, in that “through the use of [the Internet], 
any person with a phone line can become a town crier with a voice 
that resonates farther than it could from any soapbox.”35 As one 
commentator notes:  
The promise of the Internet is empowerment: it empowers ordinary 
individuals with limited financial resources to “publish” their views 
on matters of public concern. The Internet is therefore a powerful 
tool for equalizing imbalances of power by giving voice to the 
 
 32. Doe No. 1 v. Cahill, 884 A.2d 451, 457 (Del. 2005). 
 33. Lidsky, supra note 6, at 872, 876. 
 34. Id. at 865. SLAPP suits are illegal in about half of the states, as noted in Krinsky v. 
Doe 6, 72 Cal. Rptr. 3d. 231, 245 n.13 (Cal. Ct. App. 2008), but this still leaves quite a large 
number of states where anonymous speakers can be harassed for their speech.  
 35. Reno v. ACLU, 521 U.S. 844, 870 (1997).  
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disenfranchised and by allowing more democratic participation in 
public discourse. In other words, the Internet allows ordinary John 
Does to participate as never before in public discourse, and hence, 
to shape public policy.36 
If strategic or superfluous suits are engaged in by “powerful 
corporate Goliaths [who] sue their critics for speaking their minds,” 
then this promise of equalizing power will be lost and the 
“hierarchies of power” that exist in other media forms will be 
reestablished.37  
On the other hand, the Internet can be a dangerous tool in the 
hands of an irresponsible speaker determined to ruin reputations. 
One court observed that 
where speakers remain anonymous there is . . . a great potential for 
irresponsible, malicious, and harmful communication, and . . . lack 
of accountability . . . . This is particularly true where the speed and 
power of Internet technology make it difficult for the truth to 
‘catch up’ to the lie.38  
One example of an individual who abused the right to speak 
anonymously was the CEO of La Jolla Club, who posted over one 
hundred negative messages about La Jolla’s competitor, Callaway 
Golf Company, while simultaneously trading in Callaway’s stocks.39 
Thus, by establishing too strong of First Amendment protections for 
anonymous Internet speakers, the law will leave individuals or 
organizations that have been victimized by scathing speech, which 
spreads at the click of a mouse, with little or no remedy.  
Furthermore, other commentators have observed that it may be 
difficult for a plaintiff to know if litigation is worth pursuing without 
 
 36. Lidsky, supra note 6, at 860–61. 
 37. Id. at 861; see also Brief for Public Citizen, Electronic Frontier Foundation, and 
Electronic Privacy Information Center as Amici Curiae at 8–9, Melvin v. Doe, 836 A.2d 42 
(Pa. 2003) (Nos. 50 WAP 2002 and 51 WAP 2002) (“In a lawsuit filed over anonymous 
speech, the identification of the speaker provides an important measure of relief to the plaintiff 
because it enables the plaintiff to employ extra-judicial self-help measures to counteract both 
the speech and the speaker, and creates a substantial risk of harm to the speaker, who not only 
loses the right to anonymous speech but is exposed to the plaintiff’s self-help efforts to restrain 
or oppose his speech. In our system of laws, we ordinarily do not give substantial relief of this 
sort, even on a preliminary basis, absent proof that the relief is justified because success is likely 
and the balance of hardships favors the relief.”). 
 38. Quixtar Inc. v. Signature Mgmt. Team, LLC, 566 F. Supp. 2d 1205, 1214 (D. Nev. 
2008). 
 39. Vogel, supra note 9, at 820. 
DO NOT DELETE 12/20/2010 1:03:11 PM 
1309 Defamation and John Does 
 1317 
knowing the identity of the speaker.40 In Melvin v. Doe, the court 
explained that a plaintiff “needs to know the identity of the Doe 
defendants prior to incurring the expenses and other burdens of a 
trial, because it is questionable whether [a] plaintiff would wish to 
proceed with a trial if John Doe turned out to be, for example, an 
[incarcerated] inmate . . . .”41 Thus it is clear that there are strong 
competing interests both against and in favor of disclosing the 
identity of the anonymous speaker. 
D. Current Standards of Protection for Anonymous Internet Speakers 
Laws relating to anonymous Internet speakers have evolved to 
provide greater protections over time. In the 1990s, it was common 
practice for Internet service providers (“ISPs”) to simply provide 
companies or other aggrieved individuals with the identifying 
information of anonymous speakers upon request.42 In other 
situations, attorneys would draft invalid subpoenas (not issued by the 
court) to obtain anonymous identities, and even in cases where 
subpoenas were issued by the court, “the discovery was almost 
uniformly granted.”43  
Both courts and legislatures, however, began to recognize a need 
for heightened protection for the identity of anonymous speakers. A 
few states statutorily protected the rights of anonymous speakers 
through use of state shield laws by finding the comments made were 
a portion of the press’s “news gathering” function,44 while other 
states used different statutes to protect the speakers’ rights.45 Quite a 
few states and lower federal courts began to address the actual First 
Amendment right of the speakers and tried to determine what the 
 
 40. Id. at 808. 
 41. 49 Pa. D. & C.4th 449, 453 (2000), appeal quashed on other grounds, 789 A.2d 696 
(Pa. Super. Ct. 2001), rev’d, 836 A.2d 42 (Pa. 2003). 
 42. Vogel, supra note 9, at 802.  
 43. Id. at 802–03.  
 44. O’Grady v. Superior Court, 44 Cal. Rptr. 3d 72 (Cal. Ct. App. 2006); Beal v. 
Calobrisi, No. 08-CA-1075 (Fla. Cir. Ct. Oct. 9, 2008); Alton Tel. v. People, No. 08-MR-
548 (Ill. Cir. Ct., Madison County May 15, 2009); Doty v. Molnar, No. DV 07-022 (Mont. 
Dist. Ct., Yellowstone County Sept. 3, 2008); Doe v. TS, No. 08030693 (Or. Cir. Ct. Sept. 
30, 2008). 
 45. In re Application of the United States for an Order Pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 
2703(d), 157 F. Supp. 2d 286 (S.D.N.Y. 2001); Interscope Records v. Does 1–7, 494 F. 
Supp. 2d 388 (E.D. Va. 2007); Global Telemedia Int’l, Inc. v. Doe 1, 132 F. Supp. 2d 1261 
(C.D. Cal. 2001). 
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appropriate balance should be between protecting speakers’ First 
Amendment rights while still providing an adequate remedy to 
individuals who had potentially been defamed, and a few cases have 
arisen as seminal.  
The first seminal case is Columbia Insurance Co. v. 
Seescandy.com, which, though not dealing with defamation, was a 
case on which many later defamation cases relied.46 The plaintiff in 
Seescandy.com sued for trademark infringement and other business 
torts,47 and the court held that in order for the plaintiff to uncover 
the identity of the anonymous speakers, the plaintiff should first, 
“identify the missing party with sufficient specificity such that the 
Court can determine that defendant is a real person or entity who 
could be sued in federal court”;48 second, the plaintiff must describe 
the steps taken to locate the defendant and demonstrate a good faith 
effort to comply with service of process;49 third, the plaintiff must 
present a prima facie case that could withstand a motion to dismiss;50 
and fourth, plaintiff must file a motion for request of specific 
discovery with the court, accompanied by reasons for the request as 
well as identification of a limited number of persons on whom 
discovery should be served.51 One commentator noted that although 
the court in this case mentioned a motion to dismiss standard, the 
standard that was applied was actually quite a bit higher.52 
In Dendrite International, Inc. v. Doe, No. 3, a subsequent 
defamation case in New Jersey, the court relied upon the reasoning 
in Seescandy.com, and it specifically incorporated the motion to 
dismiss prong of the test.53 Dendrite involved a defamation action in 
 
 46. Columbia Ins. Co. v. Seescandy.com, 185 F.R.D. 573 (N.D. Cal. 1999). Although 
not directly dealing with defamatory, anonymous speakers on the Internet, Seescandy.com did 
provide a helpful discussion of the competing interests applicable in such a case. See id. at 578.  
 47. Id. at 576. 
 48. Id. at 578. 
 49. Id. at 579. 
 50. Id. 
 51. Id. at 580.  
 52. “While the Seescandy.com opinion uses the phrase ‘motion to dismiss,’ implying a 
minimal level of scrutiny, the court makes clear that it means to require more than that, 
although how much more is left unsaid. In particular, the court holds that ‘[a] conclusory 
pleading will never be sufficient’ but, instead of analyzing the complaint under Federal Rule of 
Civil Procedure 8(a)(2)’s ‘short and plain statement of the claim’ requirement, it suggests an 
inquiry analogous to the ‘probable cause’ inquiry in criminal procedure.” Vogel, supra note 9, 
at 805.  
 53. Dendrite Int’l, Inc. v. Doe No. 3, 775 A.2d 756 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 2001). 
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which a corporation sought the identity of an anonymous speaker 
who had made defamatory statements about the company on a 
Yahoo! bulletin.54 The court denied the plaintiff’s request to obtain 
the identity of the speaker and set forth the steps that must be taken 
before disclosing the speaker’s identity. The plaintiff must first, make 
an effort to notify the anonymous speaker and give a reasonable 
period to allow him to file an opposing position; second, the plaintiff 
must identify the exact statements alleged to constitute actionable 
speech; third, the plaintiff must set forth a prima facie cause of action 
that is sufficient to withstand a motion to dismiss; and fourth, if the 
prima facie case is presented, the court must “balance the 
defendant’s First Amendment right of anonymous free speech 
against the strength of the prima facie case presented and the 
necessity for the disclosure of the anonymous defendant’s identity to 
allow the plaintiff to properly proceed.”55  
Another important standard that was developed near the time of 
Dendrite was articulated in Doe v. 2TheMart.com.56 This court 
required first, that the subpoena be issued in good faith and not for 
an improper purpose; second, that the identifying information 
sought be directly and materially related to a core aspect of the claim 
or defense; and third, that the subpoena be unavailable from other 
sources.57 In this case, a company sought the identity of anonymous 
speakers who participated on Internet message boards and made 
statements that were critical of the company. Because the company 
failed to prove that the identifying information sought was directly 
relevant to a core defense, the court found that the speakers’ 
identities were not needed for the litigation to proceed.58  
The most recent major case was Doe No.1 v. Cahill, which first 
articulated the summary judgment standard.59 In this case, a local 
politician filed a defamation claim against a plaintiff who had made 
comments about the politician’s performance on a website related to 
public issues.60 The court set forth a standard that requires plaintiffs 
to support their claims with facts sufficient to defeat a summary 
 
 54. Id. at 762. 
 55. Id. at 760–61.  
 56. 140 F. Supp. 2d 1088 (W.D. Wash. 2001).  
 57. Id. at 1095.  
 58. Id. at 1096. 
 59. 884 A.2d 451 (Del. 2005).  
 60. Id. at 454. 
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judgment motion,61 except that plaintiffs need not produce evidence 
of things like actual malice, which are outside their control.62 The 
Cahill court rejected the balancing test set forth in Dendrite because 
it argued that this test added an unnecessary additional protection 
that was already provided by the summary judgment standard. The 
court explained that the summary judgment analysis itself provides a 
balance, and an additional balancing prong would unnecessarily 
complicate the analysis.63 
III. ANALYSIS 
This Part proceeds in Part A by discussing the inadequacy of 
current standards of protection for anonymous Internet speakers. 
Part B argues for what the author believes to be the appropriate 
standard of protection for anonymous Internet speech. Part C 
concludes the Part by considering the possibility of additional 
protections that could be created by third-party standing asserted on 
behalf of anonymous Internet speakers. 
A. The Inadequacy of Current Standards of Protection for Anonymous 
Internet Speakers 
Although many of the tests articulated in the seminal cases 
discussed above contain valuable portions of a standard to protect 
speech, none of them clearly articulated a framework that adequately 
meets the competing interests of protecting free expression and 
remedying damaged reputations. This section will analyze the 
shortcomings of each of the tests in turn. 
While in many respects Dendrite has led to great progress in the 
protections for anonymous Internet speakers,64 the test still has 
 
 61. Id. at 457. 
 62. Id. at 464. 
 63. Id. at 461. 
 64. Vogel explains that, “On the whole, though statistics are difficult to come by, there 
appears to be a substantial reduction since Dendrite in lawsuits targeting anonymous Internet 
posters.” Vogel, supra note 9, at 812. Other commentators have described Dendrite as “a 
tremendous victory for free speech.” Id. at 810–811 (citing Mary P. Gallagher, Court Erects 
Roadblocks to Flagging Cyberspammers on the Internet: Four-Step Process Must Be Followed Before 
Forcing ISP to Disclose, 165 N.J. L.J. 203 (2001)). Others have referred to it as “a ‘fair, 
workable test that stems the tide of using the threat of the subpoena power to punish people 
for criticizing others online’ . . . [but that] ‘doesn’t close the courthouse door to those with 
meritorious claims.’” Stephen R. Buckingham & Alix R. Rubin, Anonymous ‘Posters’ 
Complicate Discovery, Nov. 19, 2001 N.Y. L.J. s4, (col. 3) (citation omitted). 
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significant room for improvement. Though the first two prongs of 
the Dendrite standard (notice and setting forth exact defamatory 
statements) are fairly uncontroversial,65 the next two prongs have 
raised eyebrows among various commentators. Arguably, the most 
interesting and unique aspect of the test is the fourth prong, which 
embodies a typical balancing test. This prong allows the court more 
leeway to analyze the competing interests of the speaker and plaintiff 
on a case-by-case basis, but the test also leaves courts with a great 
deal of discretion (and very little guidance) to determine whether the 
First Amendment right or prima facie case is more important.  
Some scholars find this prong quite troubling, because the court 
is in effect saying that even if plaintiffs have alleged a viable legal 
claim against the anonymous speaker and supported the claim with 
sufficient evidence, the court may still dismiss the claim. For 
example, Vogel said, “This is an exceedingly broad level of authority 
to grant to a single, trial-level judge, and is inconsistent with the 
spirit of such rights as due process and the right to trial by 
jury . . . .”66 Indeed, this high level of discretion is illustrated even by 
the Dendrite court, which held that the plaintiffs had insufficiently 
proved damages to support their claim, whereas in a parallel case 
decided by the same court, the court did not even require a showing 
of damages.67  
The third prong of this test may also be problematic in that the 
ability of a plaintiff to present sufficient evidence to support a prima 
facie case sufficient to survive a motion to dismiss “will often depend 
dispositively on the identity of the defendant.”68 In addition, since 
“proving damages may involve complicated (and expensive) expert 
testimony concerning matters such as the effect of postings on stock 
prices, a plaintiff has a strong interest in knowing whether the 
 
 65. Though some courts have noted that the notice requirement should only be 
completed if possible and/or necessary. Krinsky v. Doe 6, 72 Cal. Rptr. 3d. 231, 244–45 (Cal. 
Ct. App. 2008). For example, the chat room may no longer be in existence, or the defendant 
may have already been notified by the ISP.  
 66. Vogel, supra note 9, at 808. 
 67. Id. at 809. 
 68. Id. at 807. “For example, when ‘actual malice’ is an element of a defamation claim, 
the plaintiff will need to know the defendant’s identity, and in all likelihood take the 
defendant’s deposition, to meet that burden. Likewise, where the poster is a competitor, 
discovery may be focused on the competitor’s efforts to lure customers or employees away 
from the plaintiff. Where stock manipulation is suspected, the defendant’s trading records will 
be essential to proving damages.” Id. at 807–08 (footnote omitted). 
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defendant has the financial means to satisfy a judgment before 
investing the resources in gathering such evidence.”69 Furthermore, 
basing First Amendment protections on a procedural hurdle that 
varies among jurisdictions seems like a risky and unpredictable 
practice, as will be discussed in greater detail below. 
As for the test in 2TheMart.com, though it provides valuable 
standards for analysis in the second and third prongs, its first 
requirement that the suit need merely be brought in good faith does 
not provide enough protection to anonymous speakers. 
Commentators have observed that 
[t]he problem with this type of test is the ease with which it can be 
abused. Because it is so deferential, a plaintiff whose real interest is 
in identifying the speaker to embarrass or harass him or her has to 
show very little before the court will unmask the speaker.70  
One court noted that the good faith requirement is an inadequate 
standard of determination because “a plaintiff may well be in actual 
subjective good faith in filing the suit believing he has a strong case 
when, in fact, he may have no case at all.”71 Conversely, a plaintiff 
who has a strong defamation case with a good chance of winning 
may care very little about winning the case and care much more 
about the social, psychological, and symbolic benefits of bringing a 
defamation case.72 Thus, there should be some objective legal 
standard to determine whether the claim brought is sufficient to 
justify piercing the veil of anonymity.73 
 
 69. Id. at 808.  
 70. Jonathan D. Jones, Note, Cybersmears and John Doe: How Far Should First 
Amendment Protection of Anonymous Internet Speakers Extend?, 7 FIRST AMEND. L. REV. 421, 
426 (2009).  
 71. In re Baxter, No. 01-00026-M, 2001 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 26001, at *37 (W.D. La. 
Dec. 19, 2001). 
 72. Lidsky, supra note 6, at 872, 876. 
 73. At least one court has argued that the determination of discovery of an anonymous 
speaker’s identity should not require “consideration of the merits of the underlying defamation 
action.” Melvin v. Doe, 836 A.2d 42, 46 (Pa. 2003). “Rather, the [analysis should be] strictly 
a legal [question], entailing consideration of what threshold requirements must be imposed as 
a prerequisite to discovery in an anonymous defamation case . . . .” This inquiry, the court 
argued, should be “plainly separable from the defamation action.” Id. However, it is highly 
debatable whether completely separating the inquiry from the merits of the case would be wise, 
or even possible. Even the most basic civil procedures, such as pleadings, must give at least 
some weight to the merits of a case. See Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 545–
46 (2007). Thus, while the legal standard must be objective, it cannot exist in a vacuum, 
isolated from the merits of the plaintiff’s claim. 
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The Cahill summary judgment standard, at first glance, may 
appear to be the optimal solution. It has increased protections for 
anonymous speakers by raising the bar from the usual motion to 
dismiss standard to requiring a factual showing sufficient to create a 
material issue of fact for elements of the claim within the plaintiff’s 
control. Yet the Cahill standard still allows for a speaker to obtain 
remedies through the clear procedure of meeting the evidentiary 
requirements to survive a summary judgment motion. Since this test 
rejects the subjective balancing test set forth in Dendrite, the Cahill 
test implements a clear, categorical rule, which almost without 
exception provides more predictability and clarity in the law. The 
justification for removing the balancing test set forth in Dendrite is 
that the underlying substantive defamation law already includes a 
balancing test, which is true when you consider that public figures 
must overcome the heavier First Amendment “thumb on the scale” 
by proving actual malice (intentional false statements or reckless 
disregard of the falsity of statements).74 Private figures must also 
overcome a presumption against them, albeit a smaller presumption, 
by proving that the speech was at least negligent.75 
However, examining the underlying “balancing test” in the 
summary judgment standard unveils a serious flaw in the analysis set 
forth by Cahill: this test requires only that plaintiffs support their 
claims with the elements within their control, and this category 
excludes things like actual malice or negligence, which are outside the 
plaintiff’s control. By excluding the requirement that a plaintiff prove 
these motives, the summary judgment test has effectively gutted all 
First Amendment hurdles that weighed down the scale in favor of 
the speaker, and thus the underlying “balancing test” is shown to be, 
in fact, non-existent. However, it would be impossible to require the 
plaintiff to prove actual malice or negligence without the identity of 
the speaker, and thus this aspect of the test seems to have reached a 
constitutional impasse. 
In addition, one court has criticized the use of a procedural 
hurdle as a method of First Amendment protection. This criticism 
applies to both the Dendrite motion to dismiss hurdle as well as the 
Cahill summary judgment hurdle. One court seeking to apply the 
divergent standards said, “We find it unnecessary and potentially 
 
 74. N.Y. Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 279–280 (1964). 
 75. Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323, 353–54 (1974). 
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confusing to attach a procedural label, whether summary judgment 
or motion to dismiss, to the showing required of a plaintiff seeking 
the identity of an anonymous speaker on the Internet.”76 The court 
pointed out that the standards governing pleadings and motions 
differ among jurisdictions, and consequently, using a procedural 
hurdle to define First Amendment protections can cause both 
confusion as well as inconsistency in application.77 For example, the 
court pointed out that in a notice pleading state the second 
requirement of Dendrite, that the defamatory statements must be set 
forth with particularity, will be essential, whereas in jurisdictions 
where pleading is more rigorous, such a requirement will be 
superfluous because specific statements will need to have already 
been included in the pleadings.78  
The deficiencies in these various tests led the Krinsky court to 
argue that heightened standards of protection for anonymous 
Internet speakers actually lead to more harm than good and that 
current litigation procedures are sufficient for protecting anonymous 
speakers.79 However, a standard that relies purely on current 
litigation procedures for defamation claims suffers from the same 
issue as mentioned in the above paragraph: namely, First 
Amendment protections rely upon procedural labels that differ 
among jurisdictions, creating an inconsistent and confusing 
application of the law. Furthermore, failing to give additional 
protections to the identity of anonymous speakers ignores the fact 
that a speaker’s identity is separate from the defamatory speech, and 
while courts are able to levy penalties for defamatory speech through 
following the guidelines of New York Times v. Sullivan, compelling 
an anonymous individual to speak his or her identity is a separate 
instance of speech that deserves a separate First Amendment analysis. 
B. The Appropriate Standard of Protection for Anonymous               
Internet Speech 
While it would be impossible to come up with a perfect 
categorical rule that properly balances the competing interests in 
 
 76. Krinsky v. Doe 6, 72 Cal. Rptr. 3d. 231, 244 (Cal. Ct. App. 2008). 
 77. Id.  
 78. Id. 
 79. Id. at 244–45, 245 n.12 (relying on views expressed by attorney and scholar 
Michael S. Vogel). 
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each case, this Comment argues that the following steps of analysis 
would be most effective in providing adequate protection for the 
identity of an anonymous speaker in a discovery request, while still 
allowing aggrieved plaintiffs to obtain a deserved remedy without 
facing undue burdens. First, the court must determine whether the 
speaker spoke in a reasonably anonymous manner; second, the 
plaintiff must present sufficient facts and evidence that the claim is 
fairly plausible; third, the identity of the speaker must be materially 
related to a core claim or defense of the plaintiff, and the plaintiff 
must not be able to obtain that information from any other source; 
and finally, the plaintiff must attempt to provide reasonable notice to 
the anonymous speaker. The first two prongs of the proposed test 
are new steps of analysis, not currently utilized in any seminal cases. 
The second two prongs of the proposed test have been incorporated 
from existing tests in a new way. Each prong of the test will be 
discussed in turn.  
First, as a threshold matter, the court should determine whether 
the anonymous speaker spoke in a forum and in a manner that made 
it reasonable for the speaker to believe the speech was anonymous.80 
This prong is likely easily met, but it is important to address because 
if the speaker has already disclosed his or her identity, allowed his or 
her identity to be disclosed, or spoken in a forum or manner where 
the speaker knew or should have known that his or her identity 
would be disclosed, then there is no need for the courts to provide 
heightened protections to the anonymous speaker’s identity. This 
issue was raised in Polito v. AOL Time Warner, Inc., where the 
plaintiff argued that the defendant had already waived his 
constitutional right to anonymity by voluntarily contacting the 
recipient in a misleading manner with harassing e-mails concerning 
the plaintiff’s mental health and other private matters.81 The court 
found that in this case it was justifiable to unveil the identity of the 
anonymous speaker.82  
 
 80. “It is difficult to speak anonymously in electronic communication without leaving a 
small piece of identifying information behind—in the case of internet speech it is the speaker’s 
internet protocol (IP) address, which is unique to each user. The address can be masked, but 
often people who speak anonymously on the internet are unaware they are leaving a digital 
fingerprint behind and fail to cover their tracks.” Jones, supra note 70, at 424 (footnote 
omitted). 
 81. Polito v. AOL Time Warner, Inc., 78 Pa. D. & C.4th 328, 331, 343 (Ct. C.P. Pa. 
2004). 
 82. Id. at 351–52. 
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Second, rather than rely on a procedural label like surviving a 
motion to dismiss or a summary judgment, or subjectively requiring 
the case to be brought in “good faith,” the plaintiff’s pleading 
should allege sufficient facts to support a fairly plausible (rather than 
a merely conceivable) claim for relief in order to pierce the veil of 
anonymity.83 This requirement is similar to a standard set forth by a 
Louisiana court attempting to apply a workable standard for 
defamation actions against anonymous speakers.84 The court argued 
that rather than applying overly burdensome and inconsistent 
procedural hurdles as a First Amendment protection, the 
requirement should be “a showing of at least a reasonable probability 
or a reasonable possibility of recovery on the defamation claim.”85 
The reason such a requirement is necessary in the realm of 
defamation actions against anonymous speakers is because “libel suits 
are hard to win but easy to bring.”86 Thus, this requirement would 
avoid inconsistent and unduly burdensome procedural hurdles or 
subjective good faith requirements but still require a sufficient 
showing to ensure that the claim being brought is valid and not 
merely superfluous.  
Of course, as in Cahill, the plaintiff will only be able to plead the 
elements of the claim that are within the plaintiff’s control—
specifically that the statements are false, that the communication was 
viewed by unprivileged third parties, and that some sort of harm was 
caused.87 Notably, it is not possible to require the plaintiff to prove 
negligence or malice at this stage of the litigation. If this test were 
the only protection for the identity of anonymous speakers that this 
Comment offered, then this test would suffer from the same 
shortcomings as Cahill, since the requirement of showing malice is 
no longer present, and thus a substantial First Amendment 
 
 83. This is essentially the heightened pleading standard recently set forth by the 
Supreme Court in Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 556 (2007) (explaining that 
this heightened standard is not “a probability requirement . . . it simply calls for enough fact to 
raise a reasonable expectation that discovery will reveal evidence” of the alleged facts). Because 
this standard is only applicable to federal courts, it will be useful to require this heightened 
pleading standard as an element of the anonymous speech analysis in order to ensure consistent 
heightened protection for anonymous speech in all jurisdictions, particularly ones that only 
require notice pleading. 
 84. In re Baxter, No. 01-00026-M, 2001 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 26001, at *38 (W.D. La. 
Dec. 19, 2001). 
 85. Id.  
 86. Lidsky, supra note 6, at 883.  
 87. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 558 (1977). 
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protection of speech is no longer present. However, as discussed in 
the subsequent paragraph, there are additional First Amendment 
protections that should be put in place in order to ensure that 
separate consideration is given to the importance of preserving the 
anonymous identity of a speaker.  
Third, even if the plaintiff has sufficiently pled the elements of 
the claim within the plaintiff’s control, the plaintiff should be 
required to go a step further in order to pierce the veil of anonymity. 
He or she should have to prove that the knowledge of the 
anonymous speaker’s identity is directly and materially related to a 
core claim or defense and that this information is unavailable from 
any other source. This is essentially the test that comes from 
2TheMart.com.88 This test is, in essence, a variation of a strict scrutiny 
requirement, in that it requires a strong interest on the part of the 
plaintiff (the central need for the information) and that the request 
be narrowly tailored to that need (in that there must be no other 
alternative to retrieve the information). It is important that some 
variation of strict scrutiny be applied when unmasking a speaker’s 
anonymity because, as previously discussed, the government is 
compelling speech through a court order in such an instance. Thus, 
this is a government action that goes beyond merely punishing 
defamatory speech, and thus deserves a separate analysis. As the 
Court has explained in McIntyre, when the government interferes 
with the content of speech by compelling an individual to speak his 
or her identity, such action must be subjected to strict scrutiny.89  
Some courts have criticized the 2TheMart.com requirement that 
identifying information be unavailable from other sources. For 
example, one court stated, “the requirement . . . in 2TheMart.com 
that the information is unavailable from any other source, is, it seems 
to me, irrelevant.”90 The court argued that it makes no difference 
whether the “plaintiff attempts to learn the identi[ty] by some other 
‘available means’ or [whether] he attempts to learn it by 
subpoena.”91 However, it is important to note that “[a] court order, 
 
 88. Doe v. 2TheMart.com, Inc., 140 F. Supp. 2d 1088, 1095 (W.D. Wash. 2001).  
 89. McIntyre v. Ohio Elections Comm’n, 514 U.S. 334, 342 (1995) (“[A]n author’s 
decision to remain anonymous, like other decisions concerning omissions or additions to the 
content of a publication, is an aspect of the freedom of speech protected by the First 
Amendment.”). 
 90. In re Baxter, No. 01-00026-M, 2001 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 26001, at *36 (W.D. La. 
Dec. 19, 2001). 
 91. Id. at 37. 
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even when issued at the request of a private party in a civil lawsuit, 
constitutes state action and as such is subject to constitutional 
limitations.”92 Thus, requiring a showing of a compelling interest 
(that the identity is materially related to a core claim) and narrow 
tailoring (that the information cannot be obtained otherwise), courts 
ensure that the government is intervening only when necessary, and 
such a limitation on government action is exactly the purpose of the 
Constitution.  
Finally, a plaintiff must make reasonable efforts, if necessary, to 
notify the anonymous speaker of the litigation and provide a 
reasonable period to allow for filing an opposing position as 
suggested in Dendrite.93 Thus, if speakers wish to intervene and 
defend their own rights in the litigation, they will have that option.94 
However, as suggested by the Krinsky court, this requirement need 
only be fulfilled if possible and/or necessary.95 For example, the 
forum of speech may no longer be in existence to notify the speaker, 
or the speaker may have already been notified by the ISP.96 
In summary, this proposed test, unlike Dendrite, does not leave 
an excessive amount of discretion with the courts. Furthermore, it 
requires consistency in application, unlike the procedural 
mechanisms of Dendrite or Cahill, while still requiring a slightly 
increased showing on the part of the plaintiff at the pleading stage of 
the litigation. Finally, it requires that some variation of strict scrutiny 
be applied to ensure that the anonymous individual is not compelled 
to reveal his or her own identity unless the plaintiff has a compelling 
interest in the information (it is related to a core claim or defense) 
and is narrowly tailored to the interest (it cannot be obtained from 
another source). However, in addition to this standard of protection, 
there is one other procedural mechanism necessary to satisfactorily 
 
 92. See Shelley v. Kraemer, 334 U.S. 1 (1948) (holding that “the action of state courts 
and of judicial officers in their official capacities is to be regarded as action of the State . . . is a 
proposition which has long been established by decisions of this Court.”). See also 
2TheMart.com, Inc., 140 F. Supp. 2d at 1091–92; see also, e.g., N.Y. Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 
U.S. 254, 265 (1964). 
 93. Dendrite Int’l, Inc. v. Doe No. 3, 775 A.2d 756, 760 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 
2001). 
 94. See, e.g., La Societe Metro Cash & Carry France v. Time Warner Cable, No. 
CV030197400S, 2003 WL 22962857, at *1 (Conn. Super. Ct. Dec. 2, 2003) (allowing the 
speaker to choose to intervene in a case when the ISP notified the speaker of the litigation). 
 95. Krinsky v. Doe 6, 72 Cal. Rptr. 3d. 231, 244 (Cal. Ct. App. 2008). 
 96. Id.  
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protect an anonymous speaker’s identity: allowing third-party 
standing, as discussed below.  
C. Additional Protections Created by Third-Party Standing Asserted 
on Behalf of Anonymous Internet Speakers 
Though the Supreme Court has never addressed the issue, it is 
possible that other organizations entrusted with the identity of 
anonymous Internet speakers could assert First Amendment rights 
on behalf of speakers and quash a subpoena for their identities 
through use of third-party standing, or jus tertii. These organizations 
might include the ISP,97 an association,98 the group to which the 
possibly defamatory speech was initially spoken,99 a company on 
behalf of a subscriber,100 the organization that hosts the 
communication forum,101 or even a press organization that posts 
stories online and allows anonymous commentary.102 
If powerful organizations such as these were able to assert First 
Amendment rights on behalf of an anonymous speaker, at least two 
very important phenomena would occur. First, in many cases, the 
addition of a more powerful player in defense of anonymous speakers 
would reduce the risk that previous regimes of power be 
reestablished, thus preserving the promise of equality and 
empowerment on the Internet.103 It goes without saying that the 
groups mentioned above (associations, companies, or the press, etc.) 
often have many more resources—politically, financially, legally—
than the average John Doe and are thus much better prepared to 
engage in litigation. As a result, these groups are less likely than John 
Doe to be intimidated by superfluous lawsuits from large companies 
or to cave under the pressure from such organizations.104 
 
 97. In re Verizon Internet Servs., Inc., 257 F. Supp. 2d 244 (D.D.C. 2003), rev’d on 
other grounds by RIAA, Inc. v. Verizon Internet Servs., Inc., 351 F.3d 1229 (D.C. Cir. 2003). 
 98. Solers, Inc. v. Doe, 977 A.2d 941 (D.C. Cir. 2009); see also, e.g., NAACP v. 
Alabama ex rel. Patterson, 357 U.S. 449 (1958).  
 99. Solers, 977 A.2d at 941. 
 100. In re Verizon Internet Servs., Inc., 257 F. Supp. 2d 244; Am. Online, Inc. v. Nam 
Tai Elecs., Inc., 571 S.E.2d 128 (Va. 2002). 
 101. Dendrite Int’l, Inc. v. Doe No. 3, 775 A.2d 756 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 2001). 
 102. Enterline v. Pocono Med. Ctr., No. 3:08-cv-1934, 2008 WL 5192386 (M.D. Pa. 
2008).  
 103. Lidsky, supra note 6, at 860–61. 
 104. The vast amount of influence and intimidation that plaintiffs can exert against 
defendants in a defamation action, even without a formal trial, is illustrated by the example of 
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The second phenomenon that would occur under this scheme 
would naturally be an increased amount of information and a 
decrease in self-censorship among anonymous speakers. This 
Comment will discuss in more detail the extensive chilling effect that 
forcing anonymous speakers to defend themselves in court can have 
on anonymous speech in general. 
A prudential principle of standing is that “[i]n the ordinary case, 
a party is denied standing to assert the rights of third persons.”105 
Two traditional justifications of this principle are first that “courts 
should not adjudicate . . . rights unnecessarily,” as the holders of the 
rights may not want them adjudicated; and second, parties are 
usually the “best proponents of their own rights,” which makes for 
the most “effective advocacy.”106 However, courts will allow an 
exception to the third-party standing prohibition in situations where 
three requirements have been met: first, the litigant must have 
suffered some sort of injury-in-fact; second, there must be some sort 
of relationship between the litigant and the person whose rights the 
litigant seeks to assert; and third, there must be some hindrance to 
the speaker’s ability to assert personal rights.107  
It is important to note that the Court has not required third-
party “relationships” to be a close familial or professional bond. The 
required relationship is a functional relationship, such that the 
litigant will be an effective advocate of the rights of the third party. 
Indeed, it is not even necessary that the litigants or third parties 
know or associate with one another. The Court has, in fact, gone as 
far as to find the requisite relationship between many unlikely pairs, 
such as between a bartender and an underage drinker,108 a juror and 
a criminal defendant,109 and a bookseller and juvenile customers.110 
 
Peter Krum. After a corporate plaintiff threatened Krum with a suit regarding his potentially 
defamatory speech, Krum, who only worked as a Fry Cook and only made about $22,000 a 
year, “made no effort to contest the suit, but instead agreed to sign an apology, pay $50 a 
month to a charity of the plaintiffs’ choice for a period of four years, and to perform three 
hours of community service every week for two years.” Id. at 882–83. 
 105. Arlington Heights v. Metro. Hous. Dev. Corp., 429 U.S. 252, 263 (1977). 
 106. Singleton v. Wulff, 428 U.S. 106, 113–14 (1976). See also Henry P. Monaghan, 
Third Party Standing, 84 COLUM. L. REV. 277 (1984). 
 107. Powers v. Ohio, 499 U.S. 400, 411 (1991).  
 108. Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190 (1976). 
 109. Powers, 499 U.S. at 413. 
 110. Virginia v. Am. Booksellers Ass’n., 484 U.S. 383 (1988). 
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The Court also often requires that the litigant asserting third-
party standing have some sort of stake in the litigation. For instance, 
in Singleton v. Wulff, the court allowed a physician to assert standing 
on behalf of his patients seeking abortions because their rights were 
tangential to his success in his practice.111 Since the physician had 
much to gain by winning the suit, he was in a better position to 
advocate the tangential rights of others. 
In some cases, it may be possible for third parties to satisfy all of 
the strict requirements for the third-party standing exception in 
order to assert the rights of anonymous speakers. The first 
requirement, that the third party have suffered some kind of 
injury,112 which is related to the requirement that the litigant have 
some sort of stake in the litigation, may be fairly easy for a party to 
prove. For example, in Solers, Inc. v. Doe, an anonymous speaker 
informed a trade association that a company had committed acts of 
copyright infringement.113 The company filed suit against the speaker 
for defamation and subpoenaed the trade association to provide the 
identity of the speaker. The trade association asserted the rights of 
the anonymous speaker through third-party standing and moved to 
quash the subpoena. Part of the reason that the trade association 
chose to do so was because the company had a “long standing policy 
of keeping the identity of [its] sources anonymous (unless required 
by law to disclose the identity) [and] . . . maintain[ing] as 
confidential the information provided by its sources[.]”114 Thus, the 
trade association had an interest in defending the rights of the tipster 
in order to protect the reputation of the association in keeping the 
tipster’s identity anonymous.115 By not allowing the association to 
assert the speaker’s rights, the association’s reputation for upholding 
its policy would be damaged, and there would be less reporting by 
 
 111. Singleton, 428 U.S. at 106 (1976). 
 112. Powers, 499 U.S. at 411 (1991).  
 113. Solers, Inc. v. Doe, 977 A.2d 941 (D.C. 2009). 
 114. Id. at 946. 
 115. It is important to note that the third-party organization would not be obligated to 
raise the rights of commentators on its website. Furthermore, as a result of the 
Communications Decency Act, Internet service providers arguably cannot be held liable for 
speech made by commentators on the site. See David R. Sheridan, Zeran v. AOL and the Effect 
of Section 230 of the Communications Decency Act upon Liability for Defamation on the Internet, 
61 ALB. L. REV. 147, 174–75 (1997). Cf. Rachel Kurth, Striking a Balance Between Section 
230 of the Protecting Civil Rights and Free Speech on the Internet: The Fair Housing Act vs. The 
Communications Decency Act, 25 CARDOZO ARTS & ENT. L.J. 805 (2007). 
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tipsters in the future as a result of the association’s damaged 
reputation. Another example is In re Verizon Internet Services, Inc., 
where the court found that Verizon had a sufficient stake in the 
litigation because of its interest in maintaining and broadening its 
client base.116  
The second requirement—that there be some sort of relationship 
between the litigant and the third party117—is also likely easily 
satisfied. As noted above, this type of relationship is merely a 
functional relationship, such that the litigant will be an effective 
advocate of the rights of the third party. If the Court allows 
bartenders to assert the rights of unknown underage drinkers,118 or 
booksellers to assert the rights of unknown juvenile customers,119 it 
seems reasonable that an organization (such as an ISP, an 
association, or the press) could assert the rights of anonymous 
speakers who trusted that organization with their identities.120  
The third, and arguably most difficult, requirement for third 
parties to achieve is that there must be some hindrance to the 
anonymous speaker preventing him or her from asserting his or her 
own rights.121 At first blush, one might attempt to argue that the 
obvious hindrance is that through engaging in litigation, the party 
will risk disclosing his or her identity. However, the Court has made 
clear that it is possible for anonymous parties to contest the unveiling 
of their identities through use of pseudonyms, thus engaging in 
litigation while still masking their identity.122 At least one court has 
argued that the desire of a speaker to preserve his or her identity is 
 
 116. In re Verizon Internet Servs., Inc., 257 F. Supp. 2d 244 (D.D.C. 2003), rev’d on 
other grounds, RIAA, Inc. v. Verizon Internet Servs., Inc., 351 F.3d 1229 (D.C. Cir. 2003). 
 117. Powers, 499 U.S. at 411 (1991).  
 118. Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190 (1976). 
 119. Virginia v. Am. Booksellers Ass’n., 484 U.S. 383 (1988). 
 120. However, it should be noted that some courts have found the relationship between 
organizations such as an ISP, an association, or the press and an anonymous speaker lacking, 
though clear justification for such a determination has yet to be given. See, e.g., Matrixx 
Initiatives, Inc. v. Doe, 42 Cal. Rptr. 3d 79 (Cal. Ct. App. 2006) (finding that a hedge fund 
manager did not have standing to defend the rights of anonymous speakers who made 
potentially defamatory statements that were traced to the hedge fund).  
 121. Powers, 499 U.S. at 411 (1991); see also, e.g., Barrows v. Jackson, 346 U.S. 249 
(1953) (finding third-party standing appropriate because the homeowner brought the suit on 
behalf of black men excluded from the neighborhood by a homeowner’s covenant and the 
black man would never be able to assert standing since he could never own a house in the 
neighborhood, which constituted a sufficient hindrance to the party from bringing his own 
rights before the court). 
 122. Doe v. Bolton, 410 U.S. 179, 187 (1973). 
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not a valid “hindrance” preventing the party from asserting his or 
her own rights.123 The Quixtar court argued that the only cases 
where a court should find that a true hindrance existed, preventing 
the speaker from asserting personal rights, would be cases in which a 
party was never put on notice that the divulgence of his or her 
identity is pending in litigation.124 However, the range of cases in 
which the speakers are unaware of the litigation, and thus truly 
unable to defend their own rights, is likely small. 
In the majority of cases, it is likely that the third-party standing 
requirements would need to be relaxed in order to achieve the 
maximum protections for anonymous speakers. It would not be 
unusual for the Court to relax these standards because standing 
requirements are already interpreted quite liberally in other areas of 
First Amendment jurisprudence.125 For example, the Supreme Court 
created an exception to the third-party standing requirements by 
allowing statutes to be invalidated on overbreadth or vagueness 
grounds.126 In such cases, a litigant is given third-party standing to 
challenge the constitutionality of an overbroad127 or vague128 statute 
even if the litigant has not personally suffered an injury (meaning 
that the litigant has not engaged in constitutionally protected activity 
that the statute makes unlawful) and even if the litigant has not 
proven that a significant hindrance exists to other parties preventing 
them from asserting their own rights if affected by the statute. 
According to Fallon, “[t]he most common account of the First 
Amendment overbreadth doctrine justif[ying] a departure from 
ordinary standing principles” is that “the foundation for the doctrine 
is prophylactic: its purpose is to combat chilling effects and other 
 
 123. Quixtar Inc. v. Signature Mgmt. Team, LLC, 566 F. Supp. 2d 1205, 1213–14 (D. 
Nev. 2008). 
 124. Id. at 1216 (quoting Powers, 499 U.S. at 411). 
 125. In re Verizon Internet Servs., Inc., 257 F. Supp. 2d 244 (D.D.C. 2003), rev’d on 
other grounds, RIAA, Inc. v. Verizon Internet Servs., Inc., 351 F.3d 1229 (D.C. Cir. 2003). 
 126. Broadrick v. Oklahoma, 413 U.S. 601 (1973); Coates v. Cincinnati, 402 U.S. 611 
(1971). 
 127. Broadrick, 413 U.S. at 615. See also Richard Fallon, Making Sense of Overbreadth, 
100 YALE L.J. 853, 863 (1991) (“When speech or expressive activity forms a significant part of 
a law’s target, the law is subject to facial challenge and invalidation if: (i) it is ‘substantially 
overbroad’—that is, if its illegitimate applications are too numerous ‘judged in relation to the 
statute’s plainly legitimate sweep,’ and (ii) no constitutionally adequate narrowing construction 
suggests itself.”); Note, The Chilling Effect in Constitutional Law, 69 COLUM. L. REV. 808 
(1969); Note, The First Amendment Overbreadth Doctrine, 83 HARV. L. REV. 844 (1970). 
 128. Coates, 402 U.S. 611. 
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impediments to constitutionally valuable expression.”129 The First 
Amendment is viewed as enjoying “a special status in the 
constitutional scheme,” and “any substantial ‘chilling’ of 
constitutionally protected expression is intolerable.”130 Justice 
Brennan articulated the need to stave off chilling effects in Walker v. 
City of Birmingham: 
To give [First Amendment] freedoms the necessary “breathing 
space to survive,” the Court has modified traditional rules of 
standing and prematurity. We have molded both substantive rights 
and procedural remedies in the face of varied conflicting interests to 
conform to our overriding duty to insulate all individuals from the 
“chilling effect” upon exercise of First Amendment freedoms 
generated by vagueness, overbreadth and unbridled discretion to 
limit their exercise.131  
As one commentator explained, “the doctrine emphasizes the 
need to eliminate [a] law’s deterrent impact—or ‘chilling effect’—on 
protected primary activity.”132 The reason being that “[a] chill on 
protected activity also means deterrence of the very litigants whose 
complaint is necessary under the as applied method to [challenge the 
law]. The results are delay in according judicial protection and 
irretrievable loss of exercise of fundamental rights.”133  
This same justification for relaxing standing requirements in the 
overbreadth and vagueness realm exists in regards to anonymous 
speakers: namely, there is a very real concern that forcing anonymous 
speakers to defend their rights in court, even under a pseudonym, 
will have a definite chilling effect upon anonymous discourse on the 
Internet. If anonymous speakers are forced to defend themselves in 
lawsuits, when their obvious goal was to avoid being noticed or 
heckled, then we are still effectively chilling anonymous speech.  
Let us take the example of Solers, where the anonymous speaker 
was aware of the suit but chose not to intervene and allowed the 
trade association to litigate on his behalf.134 If the trade association 
had not been allowed to assert third-party standing, and each 
 
 129. Fallon, supra note 127, at 867–68. 
 130. Id. at 867. 
 131. 388 U.S. 307, 344–45 (1967) (Brennan, J., dissenting) (citations omitted). 
 132. Note, The First Amendment Overbreadth Doctrine, 83 HARV. L. REV. 844, 853 
(1970). 
 133. Id. at 855.  
 134. Solers, Inc. v. Doe, 977 A.2d 941 (D.C. 2009). 
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anonymous tipster were forced to defend himself or herself in court, 
the chance that this tipster, or any other individual aware of the 
lawsuit, would be motivated to anonymously report possible illegal 
behaviors by companies in the future would be significantly 
diminished. Indeed, anonymous speakers would self-censor in order 
to avoid the hassle and expense of litigation—the essence of a 
chilling effect.  
Another example is Enterline v. Pocono Medical Center, where a 
news organization asserted third-party standing on behalf of the 
anonymous speakers who had commented on a news story.135 In this 
case, the court observed that preventing the news organization from 
asserting standing would “compromise the vitality of the newspaper’s 
online forums, sparking reduced reader interest.”136 Such a 
phenomenon is not surprising, when one considers that the 
motivation for a speaker to engage in lively debate on a news forum 
diminishes substantially if the speaker knows he or she may have to 
defend his or her rights in court, rather than rely on the newspaper 
to do so. 
Other courts and commentators have also noted the unique 
danger of a chilling effect occurring in this area of speech.137 This 
danger “justif[ies] the relaxation of rules which inhibit the litigation 
of constitutional claims in the federal courts,”138 particularly the 
requirement that an anonymous speaker have some true hindrance 
(e.g., not being aware of the litigation) preventing the speaker from 
 
 135. Enterline v. Pocono Med. Ctr., No. 3:08-cv-1934, 2008 WL 5192386 (M.D. Pa. 
Dec. 11, 2008). 
 136. Id. at *3. 
 137. See, e.g., Quixtar Inc. v. Signature Mgmt. Team, LLC, 566 F. Supp. 2d 1205, 1214 
(D. Nev. 2008) (“To fail to protect anonymity is, therefore, to chill speech.”); Doe v. 
2TheMart.com Inc., 140 F. Supp. 2d 1088, 1093 (W.D. Wash. 2001) (“If Internet users 
could be stripped of that anonymity by a civil subpoena enforced under the liberal rules of civil 
discovery, this would have a significant chilling effect on Internet communications and thus on 
basic First Amendment rights.”); Doe No. 1 v. Cahill, 884 A.2d 451, 457 (Del. 2005) 
(“[S]etting the standard too low will chill potential posters from exercising their First 
Amendment right to speak anonymously. The possibility of losing anonymity in a future 
lawsuit could intimidate anonymous posters into self-censoring their comments or simply not 
commenting at all.”); see also Lidsky, supra note 6, at 882 (arguing that the mere threat of 
being revealed may be enough to force a defendant to temper his remarks in the future); Jones, 
supra note 70, at 443 (“When the threat of later being identified exists, without a strong 
presumption in favor of keeping the speaker’s identity hidden, it has a chilling effect on the 
speaker.”). 
 138. Note, The Chilling Effect and Constitutional Law, 69 COLUM. L. REV. 808, 809 
(1969).  
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asserting his or her own rights in court. The desire of the anonymous 
speaker to remain discreet and un-heckled, coupled with the 
determination that the third-party organization will adequately 
represent the speaker’s rights, should be sufficient.  
Furthermore, one of the traditional justifications for third-party 
standing, that we do not want the court to unnecessarily litigate 
rights of litigants, does not apply in this scenario. The rights of the 
anonymous speaker are going to be litigated, at least to some extent, 
one way or another, since the premise of these types of cases is that 
the plaintiff has already filed a suit and is seeking discovery of the 
anonymous speaker’s identity. Thus, the question is not whether 
someone will have to engage in litigation to defend the anonymous 
speaker’s rights, but rather who should be allowed to do it. The use 
of third-party standing is justified when the plaintiff has attempted to 
notify the anonymous speakers of the litigation, and the speaker is 
uninterested in intervening, or worse—unaware of the litigation. 
Such an option will provide greatly needed additional protections for 
anonymous speakers, while not adding any additional legal hurdles 
for the plaintiff to overcome in order to obtain a remedy.  
IV. CONCLUSION 
In order to preserve the valuable democratic and communicative 
nature of the Internet, anonymous Internet speech must be given 
full First Amendment protection. Though at times such speech may 
be potentially defamatory, and thus possibly deserving of civil 
penalties, it is important to remember that the identity of an 
anonymous speaker is a separate type of speech entirely and that 
compelling that speech requires heightened protections not 
sufficiently provided by any one test currently implemented by 
courts. This Comment argues that the proper test is as follows: first, 
after determining as a threshold matter that the speaker had a 
reasonable expectation of anonymity in his or her speech, the 
plaintiff must secondly be able to allege sufficient facts to support a 
fairly plausible, rather than merely conceivable, claim for relief. 
Third, the plaintiff must prove that the knowledge of the speaker’s 
identity is materially related to a core claim or defense and that this 
information is unavailable from other sources; in essence, this 
requirement would impose a level of protection similar to that of 
strict scrutiny. And finally, the plaintiff must make reasonable efforts, 
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if necessary, to notify the speaker of the litigation so that the speaker 
may intervene and assert his or her own rights if he or she desires.  
However, this Comment suggests that the speaker should not be 
the only one allowed to assert his or her First Amendment rights, 
but that traditional third-party standing requirements should be 
relaxed so that the organization entrusted with the speaker’s identity 
can have the option of asserting standing on the speaker’s behalf. 
Such an option would provide additional protections for anonymous 
speakers by preventing a chilling effect on anonymous speech and by 
leveling the playing field of litigation, yet this option would not 
require the aggrieved plaintiff to overcome any additional legal 
hurdles to obtain a remedy.  
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